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John Rawls defined the principle of fair equality of opportunity as the requirement 
that “those who have the same level of talent and ability and the same willingness to 
use those gifts should have the same prospects of success regardless of their social 
class of origin, the class into which they are born and develop until the age of 
reason.”2 This principle, ever since Rawls enunciated it, has been battling a war on 
two fronts.  Looking at things from the beginning of life, it must be conceded that 
parents have broad liberty to raise their children as they see fit, engaging in a greater 
or lesser degree of nurturing and advantage giving according to any one of a broad 
array of permissible childrearing styles.  So it seems that, because of this, the social 
class of one’s origin must inevitably have a great influence on one’s prospects of 
success.  And if we look at things from the other end, asking what it is that determines 
whether a child, taking the social circumstances of her early life as given, succeeds in 
life, we notice that in a meritocratic world her array of skills is the main determinant 
of her fortune on the job market and thus a heavy influence on her success in life.  
And yet there’s so much more that goes into the cultivation of a skill besides talent 
and ability, such as being fortunate enough to be taken under the wing of an expert in 
one’s desired field, and this seems to undermine fair equality of opportunity all over 
again.   
What, then, could possibly be the place of fair equality of opportunity in a 
world of broad parental liberty and meritocracy—i.e. in our actual world?  There are 
                                                          
1 I would like to thank Lawrence Blum, Andrew Mason and Kirsten Meyer for reading and 
commenting on a previous draft of this paper. 
2 John Rawls, Justice as Fairness, ed. Erin Kelly (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press, 2001), p. 44. 
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actually two questions here, the specific question depending on whether broad 
parental liberty and meritocracy are admitted to be part of our world de jure or de 
facto.  I find both questions compelling and seek to answer them both in this essay, 
because in my view each of those two principles is both morally valid and instantiated 
in fact.  (I will defend this claim in due course.) 
 One element of my answer will be predictable and boring: broad parental 
liberty, meritocracy, and fair equality of opportunity can be made compatible by 
taking each of them to be merely pro tanto valid.  But having made this move there is 
still a great deal to be done.  Most urgently, we need to formulate a political morality 
that contains all three principles.  This requires explaining how the conjunction of 
broad parental liberty, meritocracy, and the fair equality of opportunity can constitute 
a coherent political outlook.  And then, having (hopefully) managed that, it remains to 
defend that outlook against objections.  Those two goals constitute my agenda here. 
 I begin, in §2, by arguing that the principles of broad familial liberty and 
meritocracy are each valid and inescapable.  §3, which follows, is the heart of the 
essay; it contains my preferred variant of the principle of fair equality of opportunity 
and an argument for it.  The version I endorse is rather narrow, dealing only with the 
distribution of prospects for desirable jobs and offices—and my defense of it focuses 
on explaining what is distinctively good about certain jobs.  In support for fair 
equality of opportunity so construed, I appeal to the intuition that there ought to be a 
fair competition for that good.  The rest of the essay is an effort to answer some very 
powerful, well-formulated objections to the principle of fair equality of opportunity, 
mostly from Richard Arneson and Andrew Mason.  In §4 I confront the luck 
egalitarian objection that asks why we should adopt a principle that allows prospects 
for jobs and offices to be affected by talent but not social circumstances, given that 
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the two are equally arbitrary from a moral point of view.  I argue in response that 
what counts as the right job for a person depends on what her talents are, and 
therefore there is no single competition for the distinctive good of the right job but 
rather innumerable mini-competitions among people with similar talents.  §5, 
meanwhile, addresses the worry that the distribution of jobs and offices shouldn’t be 
regulated by its own principle but rather whatever principle in our political morality 
that addresses the distribution of goods per se.  I respond by pointing out that the ideal 
of a fair competition is a non-consequentialist ideal and therefore it would make no 
sense to fold it in with a principle that addresses the distribution of goods.  Finally, in 
§6, I answer the objection that FEO has unpalatable implications for how parents are 
morally permitted to raise their children.  I argue that the ideal of setting up a fair 
competition simply has no normative purchase on ordinary individuals; it applies only 
to states.  Consequently FEO has no implications at all for how parents are morally 
permitted to raise their children.  §7 concludes. 
 
2. Broad Familial Liberty and Meritocracy 
 
In this section I aim to establish that broad familial liberty and meritocracy are each 
valid and in effect in our actual world.  By “our actual world” I mean developed 
liberal democracies.  And by “valid” I mean that they are each part of the true 
political morality—the true theory of what the state is morally obligated to do.  Note 
that I am not claiming that these principles are part of the true theory of justice.  I 
assume that justice is one of many elements of political morality; the state morally 
ought to do what is just, but it also morally ought to do other things like make sure 
everyone drives on the same side of the road.  I am simply sidestepping here the 
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question of whether broad familial liberty and meritocracy are just.  Of course, as 
G.A. Cohen emphasizes in his own effort to distinguish justice from other interesting 
questions in political philosophy3, the state should strive to be as just as it can while 
giving other kinds of consideration their due.4 This means that in trying to establish 
that broad familial liberty and meritocracy are elements of the true political morality 
we must beware of the possibility that they are incompatible with the requirements of 
justice, as that would constitute a strong counterargument. 
 As it happens, however, there is a strong case to be made that the state’s 
noninterference with broad familial liberty is a requirement of justice.  Allowing 
family members to interact with each other as they see fit (within certain loose 
boundaries) is necessary if they are to realize the goods that familial life makes 
possible, which are some of the most valuable of all goods—namely, the spontaneous 
selfless provision and receipt of love, assistance, nurturing, companionship, etc.  This 
sort of argument has been made before, and with much greater care and rigor than I 
can manage here, by other theorists.5 I will simply assume that their arguments 
succeed in establishing that broad familial liberty is a requirement of justice.  And as 
to the real-world situation, I will rest content pointing out that in every developed 
liberal democracy married couples are in fact granted this broad liberty. 
 Things are different, however, when it comes to meritocracy, because it would 
not be so easy to give a justice-based argument for that principle.  As I said, however, 
I aim only to establish that meritocracy is an element of the true political morality.  In 
                                                          
3 See his distinction between principles of justice and rules of regulation in Cohen, Rescuing Justice 
and Equality (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2008), chs. 6-7. 
4 Ibid., pp. 284, 305. 
5 See Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift, “Parents’ Rights and the Value of the Family”, Ethics 117 
(October 2006): 80-108,  “Legitimate Parental Partiality”, Philosophy & Public Affairs 37, no. 1 
(2009): 43-80, Family Values: The Ethics of Parent-Child Relationships (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2014), Part Two. 
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any event, we are getting ahead of ourselves, not having yet given a definition of the 
principle. 
 The principle of meritocracy, as I want to defend it, is the claim that jobs and 
offices should be awarded solely on the basis of the relevant qualifications.  Of course 
it’s difficult to define the idea of “relevant qualifications”.  Supposing, for instance, 
that most of the clients of Business X are racists, Business X might turn a higher 
profit by making sure that all of its employees are of a certain race.  This, on a broad 
understanding of what a qualifications is, would make race a qualification for 
employment in business X.6 
 In spite of this problem, I’ll adopt the broad understanding.7 Specifically, a 
qualification for a job or office will be any characteristic that would aid an individual 
in discharging it in a way conducive to the realizing the goals of the organization 
containing that job or office.  We can endorse meritocracy, given this understanding 
of qualifications, even if we are strongly opposed to discrimination, since we can also 
maintain that an anti-discrimination principle is a weightier element of the true 
political morality. 
 As to why we should endorse meritocracy, so understood, my answer is that a 
system that allocates jobs and offices based on qualifications promotes economic 
growth better than any other possible system, holding fixed the other relevant features 
of society such as its educational system, wage structure, etc.8 Overall it is conducive 
                                                          
6 For an interesting discussion of this problem, see Andrew Mason, “Equality of Opportunity, Old and 
New”, Ethics 111 (July 2001): 760-81. 
7 One benefit of going this route is avoiding the tricky question of whether it is possible to identify, for 
any given job, a narrower sense of qualifications for it—narrower in the sense of focusing exclusively 
on the possession of the relevant skills.  For a skeptical view on this, see Iris Marion Young, Justice 
and the Politics of Difference (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp. 200-06. 
8 There could be circumstances in which this would fail to hold, as Andrew Mason has pointed out to 
me.  If there is a group of people that is underrepresented in a certain profession due to historical 
discrimination, it might maximize productivity in the long run to use a system of positive 
discrimination, at the cost of meritocracy, as a way of increasing that group’s representation in the 
profession.  This would be the case if such positive discrimination could be expected to encourage 
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to economic growth that organizations achieve their goals, since those goals generally 
include increasing the production of some good or service.  If we add to this the 
principle that the state is morally obligated to promote economic growth9 then we 
have in hand a complete argument for meritocracy as an element of the true political 
morality.  And surely most of us do believe that the state has this obligation.  
Economic growth in general has the effect of reducing inequality10 and 
unemployment and of increasing well-being, and most of us would accept, with 
respect to at least one of these goals, that the government is obligated to pursue it.  
 Of course these goals often come into conflict with other goals, and I don’t 
mean to say that the former goals are always more morally urgent.  I am defending 
meritocracy here as pro tanto valid.  If meritocracy were an overriding principle, then 
the right thing to do would be to simply conscript the most qualified person for each 
job or office.  But this seems highly objectionable. 
 This raises the question of how meritocracy can be put into effect, in a morally 
permissible way, given its pro tanto status.  The best answer, I think, is that it can be 
put into effect by instituting a free market.  Free market societies must be 
meritocracies by and large,11 since organizations generally pursue their goals to the 
best of their ability and this, by the earlier definition of ‘qualification’, requires hiring 
the most qualified people to fill vacancies.  Now there is probably a more powerful 
argument for the free market than its instrumental role in realizing meritocracy, but 
that’s beside the point.  My agenda with respect to meritocracy is twofold: to establish 
                                                                                                                                                                      
younger members of that group to pursue that profession, thereby unlocking productive potential that 
would otherwise have gone unused. 
9 This utility-promotion principle is not intended as a principle of distributive justice; it is intended to 
stand alongside whatever the true principle(s) of distributive justice is/are.  So if distributive justice 
takes something other than utility as its currency, or if it tells us to sacrifice maximization of the 
currency to some extent if that’s necessary to achieve some distributive pattern, that’s no objection to 
the utility-promotion principle.  I thank Andrew Mason for urging me to be clear about this. 
10 Thomas Piketty, Capital in the 21st Century, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 2013). 
11 By “must be” I mean “it would stand to reason that”. 
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its moral validity and to show that it is in effect in our actual world.  I mention the 
free market only to persuade the reader that our actual world must be, by and large, a 
meritocracy.  Having made that argument, and having argued earlier for the moral 
validity of the principle of meritocracy, I’ll rest content. 
 
3. An Argument for Fair Equality of Opportunity 
 
In this section I intend to defend the principle of fair equality of opportunity (FEO) 
and show how it can be part of a coherent political outlook that also contains broad 
parental liberty and meritocracy.  First, however, we need to know just what claim 
FEO is. 
 On the statement of it from Rawls that I quoted at the outset, it says something 
about how “prospects for success” should be distributed.  However, it must be said 
that Rawls is quite inconsistent on the matter of what the currency12 of FEO is.  In 
other places Rawls puts forward FEO as a principle regulating the distribution of 
prospects for “culture and achievement”13, “income and wealth”14, and “advantaged 
social positions”15.  And for Rawls FEO is embedded within a broader principle, the 
second principle in his two-principle theory of justice, that says, 
 
 social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are…attached to offices and 
positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity,16 
 
                                                          
12 By “currency” I mean that which is to be distributed. 
13 A Theory of Justice, pp. 73, 74. 
14 Ibid., p. 74. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid., p. 266. 
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thus suggesting that FEO is to directly regulate the distribution of offices and 
positions and regulate the distribution of social and economic inequalities only 
indirectly. 
 I don’t know what version of FEO Rawls really meant to endorse, but I’ve 
argued in another essay that the most plausible version of FEO will take only 
positional opportunities as its currency.17 A positional opportunity is an opportunity 
for a good such that improving one’s opportunity to access that good necessarily 
comes at the cost of diminishing someone else’s opportunity to access that good.  
Positional opportunities are, to put it simply, opportunities to access goods that are in 
limited supply. 
 That being the case, we should reject any version of FEO that takes as its 
currency prospects for culture and achievement or income and wealth, since we can 
make more of all of those things.18 One currency that emerges as quite appropriate, by 
contrast, is opportunities for jobs and offices, which is pretty close to Rawls’s “offices 
and positions”.  Although we can affect the number of opportunities for jobs and 
offices, most obviously by stimulating or depressing economic growth, opportunities 
for jobs and offices are in many circumstances positional-for-practical-purposes—
meaning that we can find ourselves in a position where there’s nothing we can do to 
make more of them—which I’ve argued is good enough to make such opportunities a 
proper currency for FEO.19 
                                                          
17 Benjamin Sachs, “The Limits of Fair Equality of Opportunity”, Philosophical Studies 160:2 
(2012):323-43 at 335-40. 
18 This isn’t to say that there is no competition for these goods.  Rather, these are goods for which we 
compete and of which we can make more.  Thanks to Lawrence Blum for pushing me to be clear about 
this. 
19 Ibid., p. 340.  As to whether opportunities for “social positions” constitute a proper currency for 
FEO, I’m not sure what to say, since my grasp of what a social position is is a bit hazy.  But FEO can 
have more than one kind of currency, and I simply want to establish that opportunities for jobs and 
offices should be one such kind. 
 9 
Knowing this much about FEO, a clearer picture of the relationship between 
meritocracy and FEO begins to emerge: Since meritocracy regulates the distribution 
of jobs and offices themselves, saying that FEO regulates the distribution of 
opportunities for jobs and offices is equivalent to saying that FEO regulates the 
distribution of prospects for succeeding in the meritocracy.  
 But the picture is not yet clear enough.  In order to fully specify a version of 
FEO we have to fill in the timing variable in addition to the currency variable.  
That is, we have to say at what time prospects for doing well in the meritocracy 
should be equal.  I’ve argued elsewhere that FEO is most plausible when understood 
as requiring that prospects be equal at one time, as opposed to perpetually or 
intermittently.20 Specifically, prospects should be equal among those entering 
majority at a given time.  This dovetails nicely with the idea that FEO should be 
understood as opportunity to do well in the meritocracy, since the meritocracy is a 
non-issue for minors, supported as they are by their parents or some other guardian. 
 While I’ve argued elsewhere that the currency and timing variables should be 
filled in in the way I’ve suggested here, I’ve never before argued that FEO is a true 
principle of political morality.  All I’ve done elsewhere is show that my preferred 
version of FEO avoids some objections that doom other versions.  But having gained 
a better grasp of the place of FEO in a meritocratic world, I now feel able to articulate 
with some precision just what it is about FEO that should appeal to us.  I take on this 
task for the remainder of this section.  In §4 I return to the job of making FEO more 
precise, arguing there for a particular stance regarding among which individuals 
opportunities for jobs and offices should be equal at the time of majority. 
                                                          
20 “The Limits of Fair Equality of Opportunity”, pp. 327-35. 
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To understand the moral force of FEO we need a better grasp on what’s good 
about the thing it distributes, namely opportunities for jobs and offices.  The first 
thing to say here is that opportunities for jobs and offices are merely instrumentally 
good; they are good because the possession of such opportunities leads to the 
possession of jobs and offices themselves.  Now one might ask, as Richard Arneson21 
and Stephen Kershnar22 have, why we should adopt a principle regarding the 
distribution of a merely instrumental good when we could instead adopt a principle 
regarding the distribution of the good for which it is an instrument.  So I want to say 
something about this before discussing what is good about jobs and offices. 
I am taking as meritocracy as given, based on the argument I gave in §2.  This 
amounts to taking as given a principle for distributing jobs and offices.  The argument 
for meritocracy was not based on an analysis of the good of a job or offices.  So it 
can’t be accurately said that we’ve already adopted a principle that is suitable to the 
kind of good that a job or office is.  Rather, the argument for meritocracy was based 
on 1) the observation that distributing jobs and offices in a certain way is conducive to 
reducing inequality and unemployment and to increasing well-being and 2) the 
principle that the state is morally obligated to pursue at least one of these goals.  So 
the moral heart of the argument for meritocracy comes from a moral analysis of the 
purpose of the state (which I breezed through), not a moral or evaluative analysis of 
jobs and offices.23 Nevertheless, jobs and offices are apt for this kind of analysis, 
because they are indeed good.  The question is this: Once we’ve produced this 
                                                          
21 Arneson, “Equality of Opportunity Defended and Recanted”, Journal of Political Philosophy 7 
(1999): 488-97 and “Equality of Opportunity: Derivative not Fundamental”, Journal of Social 
Philosophy 44 (Winter 2013): 316-330 at 321-2 and 326-7. 
22 Kershnar, “Why Equal Opportunity is not a Valuable Goal”, Journal of Applied Philosophy 21: 159-
72. 
23 Which is a good thing, since a moral or evaluative analysis of jobs and offices would certainly not 
lead to the conclusion that they should be distributed meritocratically.  This point has been argued for 
in Mason, “Equality of Opportunity, Old and New” and in Norman Daniels, “Merit and Meritocracy,” 
Philosophy and Public Affairs 7, no. 3 (1978): 206-23. 
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analysis, what do we do with it?  We can’t use it to derive a principle for regulating 
the distribution of jobs and offices; we already have one of those.24 The best we can 
do, this being the case, is to use it to derive a principle for regulating the competition 
for jobs and offices.  Once we’ve noticed that jobs and offices are competed for, as 
opposed to simply being awarded, it becomes possible to understand the competition 
for them as being a potential bearer of morally good or bad qualities.  So we have a 
nice match: we have a moral/evaluative analysis of a good (the analysis of the good of 
a job or office, yet to be produced) and a feature of society that regulates the 
distribution of that good and seems apt for regulation via a moral principle.  So it 
seems only natural to put the two together, deriving the principle from the analysis. 
So much for the question of why there should be a principle regulating the 
distribution of opportunities for jobs and offices.  We can now, at last, move on to the 
question of what is good about a job or office. 
There are, no doubt, many right answers to this question.  I will focus on 
establishing just one of them.  My view is that if we can agree that this is one of the 
goods of a job or office, then we should be able to agree on FEO as formulated earlier 
in this section.  
I begin with a clarification: the good that I want to identify isn’t one that 
attaches to jobs or offices per se; rather it attaches to the right job or office, in a 
certain sense of “right” that I will specify.  
Next, I want to call attention to a distinctive kind of good—the good of 
exercising one’s refined and fulfilled talents.  Rawls describes that good this way: 
 
                                                          
24 Or, rather, we could, but it would be worth our time to do so only if we thought that the derived 
principle might have a chance of outweighing the principle of meritocracy.  But I assume that we’re 
confident that it won’t. 
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Other things equal, human beings enjoy the exercise of their realized capacities (their innate or 
trained abilities), and this enjoyment increases the more the capacity is realized, or the greater 
its complexity.  The intuitive idea here is that human beings take more pleasure in doing 
something as they become more proficient at it, and of two activities they do equally well, they 
prefer the one calling on a larger repertoire of more intricate and subtle discriminations.25 
  
It’s possible to ground an argument for FEO in the claim that this kind of good can be 
realized in the carrying out of a job or office.  Robert Taylor makes an argument like 
this.26 But an argument of this sort is vulnerable to Arneson’s insight that this 
distinctive sort of good can be realized by means other than the carrying out of a job 
or office.27  
Fortunately, though, we can make an argument based on Rawls’s analysis of 
this particular good and inspired by Taylor’s argument but immune to Arneson’s 
objection.  Assuming one is going to work for a living during one’s adulthood, one’s 
job or office determines how one will spend half of one’s waking adult life.  And the 
distinctively bad outcome that this situation makes possible is being consigned to 
spend this time engaged in an activity that doesn’t call upon one’s refined and 
fulfilled talents.  There is a distinctive kind of soul-crushing misery that accompanies 
suffering this fate—the kind of misery that many early 20th-century social critics had 
in mind when condemning the assembly line.28 It is a correlate of the distinctive good 
Rawls identified, but is not its mere absence.  In fact, a single life—indeed, a single 
day of a single life—can contain the realization of both the good and its negative 
correlate.  So even if one has opportunities, outside of work, to exercise one’s refined 
                                                          
25 A Theory of Justice, p. 374. 
26 Taylor, “Self-Realization and the Priority of Fair Equality of Opportunity”, Journal of Moral 
Philosophy 1 (2004): 333-47; see esp. pp. 340-1. 
27 Arneson, “Equality of Opportunity: Derivative not Fundamental”, pp. 320-1.  Taylor anticipated this 
objection (“Self-Realization and the Priority of Fair Equality of Opportunity”, p. 341), but in my view 
didn’t do enough to defuse it. 
28 One possible mechanism, connecting the having of a non-challenging job to being unhappy, is letting 
one’s mind wander.  Letting one’s mind wander seems to cause unhappiness, and whether an 
individual’s mind is wandering at any particular moment is a better predictor of whether that individual 
will be happy at that moment than the activity in which that individual is engaged.  See Matthew A. 
Killingsworth and Daniel T. Gilbert, “A Wandering Mind is an Unhappy Mind”, Science 330, no. 6006 
(2010): 1924-31. 
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and fulfilled talents—in hobbies, for instance—that merely counterbalances, as 
opposed to undermines, the misery one is likely to experience if one’s job doesn’t 
make use of one’s refined and fulfilled talents.  No good is so excellent such that the 
time spent realizing that good makes it not-bad to spend half of one’s waking adult 
life doing something that one finds boring. 
My conclusion is that there is a particularly brutal kind of bad that one avoids 
only by obtaining the right kind of job or office—one that calls upon one’s talents in 
the way specified.29 So in the end I do not actually have anything original to say about 
the good of the right job or office; rather, I have something to say about the bad of the 
wrong job or office.  But this will do just as well for grounding an argument for FEO. 
The argument will begin by noting that if our society’s basic structure is going 
to inflict a serious harm on various individuals then it matters morally how it is 
determined who suffers that harm.  Of course the harm in this case is attached to jobs 
and offices, and we already have a principle for distributing jobs and offices.  But, as I 
argued earlier, it’s plausible to suppose that our evaluative analysis of jobs/offices can 
be appropriately deployed to ground a principle regulating opportunities for jobs or 
offices.  Now since jobs and offices are positional-for-practical-purposes, so is the 
opportunity to avoid getting harmed in the distinctive way associated with ending up 
in the wrong job or office.  Absent special circumstance, it seems that everyone 
should have an equal opportunity at the age of majority—that is, before the time at 
which they being to engage in activities for which they can be held responsible and 
which might affect their opportunity—to avoid this harm.  Securing an equal 
                                                          
29 The closest Rawls comes to acknowledging this bad is his recognition of the good of “meaningful 
work” (A Theory of Justice, pp. 257, 464).  Rawls seems to believe that we could build a society in 
which everyone has meaningful work (ibid., p. 464) but fails to explain how this is achievable without 
violating the principle of meritocracy.  (Of course Rawls rejects “meritocracy”, but what he means by 
that term is a far cry from what I mean by it; he has in mind a principle that distributes opportunities 
for jobs and offices unequally in accordance with individuals’ unequal possession of natural and social 
advantages (ibid., pp. 91-2).) 
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opportunity means putting in place a level playing field in the competition to avoid 
the distinctive harm of the wrong job/office.30 That is what FEO requires, and 
consequently FEO inherits moral appeal from the compellingness of the idea of a 
level playing field. 
Notice that the idea of a level playing field is applicable only when we’re 
talking about distributing opportunities for jobs and offices; it is entirely irrelevant to 
the project in which employers are engaged—namely the project of distributing the 
jobs and offices themselves.  (Think of how the idea of a level playing field is 
applicable when setting up a race but not applicable to awarding medals once the race 
has been run.) So my defense of FEO doesn’t commit me to aligning myself with any 
principle regarding the distribution of jobs and offices.  The principle of careers open 
to talents is such a principle, the way I understand it: it requires that employers fill 
their vacancies in a non-discriminatory way.  So while Rawls endorsed careers open 
to talents alongside FEO, I am not committed to doing so.  I find this a relief, since 
Arneson raises very compelling worries about careers open to talents alongside his 
objections to FEO.31 
 
4. The Luck Egalitarian Objection to FEO and the Question of Scope 
 
Having argued for my preferred version of FEO I am now in a position to respond to 
some very important, well thought-out objections to the principle.  The first objection 
concerns the scope of the principle; that is, the set of individuals among whom 
opportunities are to be equalized.  Rawls specified that opportunity should be equal 
among those who are equal in terms of talent and willingness to put forth effort.  A 
                                                          
30 I expand on the idea of a level playing field in “The Limits of Fair Equality of Opportunity”. 
31 Arneson, “Against Rawlsian Equality of Opportunity”, pp. 104-7; see also pp. 92-3. 
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principle crafted in this way requires the state to nullify the influence on opportunity 
of anything aside from talent and willingness to put forth effort.  As Rawls 
emphasized, this means that the state should nullify the effects of the social 
circumstances of one’s birth on one’s opportunity level, which is a morally appealing 
goal for the state to take up given how such circumstances are arbitrary from a moral 
point of view.32 The objection, however, is that the distribution of talents is morally 
arbitrary as well, and so if there is a case for neutralizing the effects of social 
circumstances due to their moral arbitrariness then there should be a case for 
neutralizing the effects of talent.33 So a more plausible version of FEO would have as 
its scope individuals who are equal in terms of effort alone.  Call this the ‘luck-
egalitarian objection’. 
 A sound response to this objection emerges when we recall what the 
distinctive good of the right job or office is—namely, the avoidance of the distinctive 
bad of being stuck spending half of one’s waking adult life engaged in an activity that 
doesn’t call on one’s refined talents.  For people with musical talent, achieving that 
good means having a job as a musician.  For athletic people that means having a job 
as an athlete.  And so on for the other kinds of talent.34 Consequently “doing well in 
the meritocracy”, which is what FEO requires that there be equal opportunity for, 
means something different to each person depending on her talents.  Therefore, there 
                                                          
32 A Theory of Justice, pp. 63-5. 
33 Richard Arneson, “Against Rawlsian Equality of Opportunity”, Philosophical Studies 93, no. 1 
(1999): 77-112 at 93-7.  One response to the luck egalitarian objection, the effectiveness of which I 
won’t assess here, is the denial of the possibility of identifying an individual’s talents independent of 
her social circumstances.  This is Lesley Jacobs’s response; see his Pursuing Equal Opportunities 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), ch. 3.  Matthew Clayton suggests, in addition, that 
even if talents and social circumstances could be neatly pulled apart in theory, it would be a violation 
of political liberalism to build that distinction into a conception of justice since such conceptions 
should not rely for their institutionalization on distinctions and measurements that will be controversial 
in practice, as will any claim to the effect that such-and-such an amount of X’s lot in life is a result of 
her talent as opposed to her circumstances (or vice-versa).  See Matthew Clayton, “Rawls and Natural 
Aristocracy”, Croatian Journal of Philosophy 1, no. 3 (2001): 239-59 at 257-8. 
34 I oversimplify here, speaking of people as if they have only one talent each.  I don’t really mean to 
suggest that this is the case. 
 16 
is no sense to be made of a talent-insensitive version of equality of opportunity; 
equality of opportunity has to be relative to talent.    
 This means that what we might casually call the “competition” for jobs and 
offices is really a cluster of mini-competitions among people with similar talents.  
That’s why it makes no sense to propose that the principle of equality of opportunity 
for jobs and offices should not be relativized to talent. 
 I suspect that the reason why this response to the luck-egalitarian objection 
has not been made before is that Rawls set us down the wrong track in constructing a 
defense of his talent-sensitive version of FEO.  Curiously, his comments, excerpted 
above in §3, regarding the good of being able to exercise one’s subtle and developed 
talents formed no part of his argument for FEO.  Rather, Rawls seems to identify the 
good whose distribution FEO was meant to regulate—and thus presumably the 
distinctive good of a job or office—as “authority and responsibility”35 and “the 
realization of self which comes from a skillful and devoted exercise of social 
duties.”36 Although Rawls doesn’t elaborate on these comments, one could be 
forgiven for thinking that Rawls takes the distinctive good of a job or office to be its 
affording one the opportunity to skillfully execute the duties of some publicly-
recognized office.  This being the case, the luck egalitarian can claim, at least 
somewhat plausibly, that the distinctive good of a job or office is going to be closed 
off to certain people purely in virtue of their talent because not everyone has the 
necessary talent to go into public service.  The luck egalitarian could even allow us to 
expand our notion of publicly-recognized office, so that it includes other professions, 
outside the public service, that are generally recognized as socially necessary, such as 
medicine, law, and teaching, and point out that we are still forced to the same 
                                                          
35 A Theory of Justice, p. 53. 
36 Ibid., p. 73. 
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conclusion: that FEO offers absolutely nothing to certain people, namely those who 
lack a certain set of talents.37 
 Again, however, we can respond by conceding for the sake of argument that 
not everyone is born with the talent necessary for eligibility for public service while 
insisting that everyone is born with some talent or other.  In other words, no one is 
born to do unskilled labour (though there is unskilled labour to be done and someone 
has to do it, which is the whole problem).  So FEO, understood as requiring equal 
prospects for succeeding in the meritocracy, does indeed offer something to everyone: 
it offers them a chance, on a par with everyone else of similar talents, to access the 
jobs and offices that call on the skillful exercise of the developed versions of those 
talents. 
 Still, however, while (hopefully) conceding that FEO so understood offers 
something to everyone, a luck egalitarian is likely to worry that it nevertheless offers 
more to the more talented.  If in speaking of “equally talented” people the principle is 
referring to people who have the same kind of talent and the same amount of it—
which is exactly how we should understand it, I maintain—then that principle will not 
seek to equalize prospects among those with unequal amounts of the same talent.  In 
other words, it will allow unequal talent to develop into unequal skill.  And since skill 
is rewarded in a meritocratic world, FEO allows for a situation in which more-
talented people end up in a better position than less-talented people with respect to 
avoiding the distinctive bad we’ve been talking about.38 
 To arrive at an adequate response to this worry, we need to take a closer look 
than we have thus far at the distinctive bad of having a job that doesn’t call upon the 
                                                          
37 This way of putting the luck egalitarian objection is suggested in Arneson, “Against Rawlsian 
Equality of Opportunity”, pp. 81-3.  Thomas Pogge, too, raises a criticism along these lines, in his 
Realizing Rawls (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989), p. 171. 
38 I thank Kirsten Meyer for pushing me to address this objection. 
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skillful use of one’s developed talents.  One obvious aspect of this bad that I’ve yet to 
point out is that it comes in degrees.  In particular, a job can call on one’s developed 
talents while requiring a more or less skillful exercise of them.  Or to put this more 
straightforwardly: among challenging jobs some are more challenging than others.  
And how challenging a job is depends on the skillfulness of the person trying to 
perform it. 
 Consequently, there’s a way in which extra skill—and by extension, extra 
talent—is a disadvantage.  For any given job, it will be less challenging for a 
particular person the more of the relevant skill she possesses.  So for any given job, 
it’s better to be one of the less-talented people to get it, all else being equal.  (I assume 
that in a meritocratic world the least-skilled people who perform any given job are 
still skilled enough to perform it competently.)  
Here is an illustration.  Suppose there are two people who are skilled enough 
to be competent surgeons, and that they each get a job whose sole function is the 
performing of appendectomies.  One of these people, I’ll stipulate, has skill to spare.  
Performing appendectomies is, for this person, experienced only as somewhat of a 
challenge.  For the other person, by contrast, it is the perfect challenge: she can do it 
well, but only by mustering all the mental and physical resources she has at her 
disposal.  All else being equal, I submit that the latter surgeon has more fully avoided 
the distinctive bad of spending her working life doing something that doesn’t call on 
the skillful use of a developed talent. 
The phenomenon that the above scenario is supposed to represent is a very 
real one in our society.  It is all too common for highly credentialed job candidates to 
wind up in positions for which they are overqualified.  This is what happens when 
higher education becomes an expectation as opposed to a bonus. 
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What we should infer from all this, I conclude, is that in a meritocratic world 
where FEO is in place, the more talented will indeed have better chances of getting 
any given job but will also get less out of any given job than the less talented.  Or to 
put this more carefully, the more talented will have a better chance of avoiding the 
worst outcome—having to work a job that doesn’t call on one’s refined talents at 
all—but a worse chance of obtaining the best outcome, namely getting a job that 
makes just the right call on one’s refined talents. 
  
 
5. The Separate Principle Objection 
 
Another objection to FEO begins by accepting, at least for the sake of argument, that 
there is a distinct kind of good that attaches to holding a job or office.  I’ve identified 
that good as the avoidance of a bad—namely the bad of being stuck in a job that 
doesn’t call upon one’s refined talents—while Rawls, as we saw earlier, identifies that 
good as “the realization of self which comes from a skillful and devoted exercise of 
social duties,” and other defenders of FEO offer their own proposals regarding the 
identity of this good.39 The objector grants this but then asks why opportunities for 
this good, which presumably is just one among many, should be distributed according 
to their own principle.40 Call this the ‘separate principle’ objection. 
 This principle is often raised in the same breath as a related one—the 
objection to the idea that FEO should be lexically prior to whatever principle 
                                                          
39 Seana Valentine Shiffrin, for instance, identifies it as the good of self-realization.  See Shiffrin, 
“Race, Labor, and the Fair Equality of Opportunity Principle”, Fordham Law Review 72 (2004): 1643-
75. 
40 Arneson, “Against Rawlsian Equality of Opportunity”, pp. 97-100, “Equality of Opportunity: 
Derivative not Fundamental”, pp. 321-2; Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift, “Equality, Priority, and 
Positional Goods”, Ethics 116 (2006): 471-97 at 484-5. 
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regulates the distribution of the rest of the goods. This objection is generally raised 
specifically against Rawls, according to whom FEO should be lexically prior to the 
difference principle, which regulates the distribution of other goods.41 But this related 
objection can be set aside, since I have no intention of suggesting that FEO should be 
prior, never mind lexically prior, to any other principle. 
 Back, then, to the issue at hand: Why should there be a separate principle 
regulating the distribution of opportunities for the particular kind of good that attaches 
to jobs/offices?  The key to answering this objection is to remember that FEO 
regulates the distribution of opportunities for a certain kind of good, whereas the 
distribution of the good itself is regulated, we are assuming, by the principle of 
meritocracy.42 Furthermore, there was nothing in my defense of FEO that suggested 
that there is something good—something non-instrumentally good, specifically—
about opportunities for the distinct good of the right job/office.  So FEO isn’t actually 
a principle for regulating the distribution of a good.  Therefore, of course the principle 
that regulates the distribution of such opportunities should be distinct from the 
principle that regulates the distribution of goods. 
 This way of answering the separate principle objection naturally raises a 
further question: Why should we be worried about the distribution of something that 
is not non-instrumentally good?  To answer this challenge we need to recall what the 
argument was in the first place for endorsing FEO: it is a way of instantiating the 
moral ideal of a level playing field.  Importantly, this makes FEO a non-
consequentialist moral ideal.  This, again, should make clear why FEO should be a 
                                                          
41 Though Rawls later seemed to retract this claim.  See Raws, Justice as Fairness, p. 163n.  For a 
defense of the lexical priority of FEO against this objection, see Shiffrin, “Race, Labor, and the Fair 
Equality of Opportunity Principle”. 
42 This of course raises the question of why we should endorse the principle of meritocracy instead of 
opting to have the distribution of the distinct good of a job/office regulated according to whatever 
principle regulates the distribution of goods per se.  Mason attempts to meet this challenge in “Equality 
of Opportunity, Old and New”, though his argument for meritocracy is quite different from mine and 
therefore I don’t endorse his way of meeting the challenge. 
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separate principle instead of getting folded in with whatever principle regulates the 
distribution of goods.43 
 This way of responding to the separate principle objection forces Arneson, the 
originator of that objection, to confront a dilemma.  If he accepts, in principle at least, 
that the true political morality might contain principles grounded in non-
consequentialist moral ideals, then he has to argue that there is no moral appeal to the 
ideal of a level playing field.  To my knowledge he has never attempted to make such 
an argument.  On the other hand, if he rejects in principle the possibility of the true 
political morality containing a principle grounded in a non-consequentialist moral 
ideal, then it will become clear that the separate principle objection is really just a 
veiled assertion of consequentialism in political morality—the claim that all political 
ideals are grounded in evaluative considerations.  It’s possible, of course, that 
consequentialism in political morality is the truth, and I have no intention here of 
arguing to the contrary.  But Arneson’s objection to FEO becomes rather 
uninteresting if it turns out that he is simply unwilling per se to consider the viability 
of a non-consequentialist political morality.44 
 
6.  The Childrearing Objections 
 
                                                          
43 It also functions as a response to Clayton’s objection to FEO, which is that if we find prioritarianism 
appealing, as Rawls does, then we should be happy to have the distribution of opportunities be 
regulated by the difference principle, which is prioritarian, thus eliminating the need for FEO (Clayton, 
“Rawls and Natural Aristocracy”).  Again, however, FEO as I understand is a purely moral ideal, and 
therefore its function cannot be co-opted by a prioritarian (or egalitarian, or sufficientarian, or […]) 
principle for the distribution of goods. 
44 One thing we can say for sure is that the present-day Arneson is a consequentialist about political 
morality.  (See his endorsement of the idea that justice requires “the greatest possible degree of 
fulfillment of the morally supreme goal”, which is enhancing the quality of people’s lives: Arneson, 
“Equality of Opportunity: Derivative Not Fundamental”, p. 316.) But this is insufficient to establish 
that his objection to FEO is nothing more than an assertion of consequentialism. 
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I want to turn again to the relationship between FEO and broad parental liberty.  FEO 
has been subjected to two powerful objections based on its implications for how 
parents should raise their children.  I call them the ‘childrearing objections’. 
 The first childrearing objection is Arneson’s and constitutes another worry 
about the scope of FEO.  FEO insists that opportunities be equal among those equal in 
talent and willingness to put forth effort.  That has the effect of treating talent and 
willingness to put forth effort as given and beyond the reach of the demands of 
political morality, or at least beyond the reach of anything FEO has to say about those 
demands.  We have already seen why it might be thought troublesome to take talents 
as given; this was the origin of the luck egalitarian objection.  In addition, it might be 
thought troublesome to take the willingness to put forth effort as given.  One 
determinant of an individual’s willingness to put forth effort is her ambition, which is 
affected by how she is raised and socialized.  For instance, if she is raised and 
socialized to think that the only appropriate role for her in society is to be a 
homemaker, then she is likely wind up lacking the ambition to do anything else.  This 
seems like an objectionable outcome, and yet one that FEO cannot condemn.  And as 
Debra Satz has pointed out, this is just the tip of the iceberg.45 There are many ways 
in which childrearing and socialization determine one’s willingness to put forth effort, 
and it seems awfully troubling for a political morality to offer nothing to those who 
through their childrearing and socialization wind up with very little willingness to put 
forth effort. 
 I do not have anything original to say by way of response to this objection, 
I’m afraid.  I’ll simply endorse what Satz and Arneson have already said, which is 
that FEO can be supplemented with other principles that can condemn at least some 
                                                          
45 Satz, “Unequal Chances: Race, Class and Schooling”, Theory and Research in Education 10 (2012): 
155-70 at 160. 
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of these effects of childrearing and socialization or can be expanded so as to issue this 
condemnation itself.46 
 The second childrearing objection is more disconcerting.  Suppose we agree 
that childrearing practices are a significant determinant of the level of opportunity to 
succeed in the meritocracy that a child will have upon entering majority.  If we accept 
broad parental liberty, as I have argued that we should, then we believe that the state 
should refrain from interfering with many of these practices.  Once again, then, a 
feature of our actual world presents a problem for FEO.   
But this doesn’t have to spell the end of the ideal of fair equality of 
opportunity.  If parents took it upon themselves to forgo the activities that would 
otherwise give their children advantages over other similarly endowed children, then 
FEO could yet be achieved.  So it seems that they’re obligated to do so. 
 Mason, who provides the most forceful instance of this objection, anticipates 
the likely response: Parents have either special obligations to, or special prerogatives 
with respect to, their children, and these obligations/prerogatives make it permissible 
or perhaps even obligatory for them to do the things that have the side effect of giving 
their children advantages over other similarly endowed children.  But Mason points 
out, by way of rejoinder, that even if we concede this it still seems that FEO implies 
that parents have a strong reason to refrain from these activities.  And this is still quite 
counterintuitive.47 
 I prefer to make a different response to this objection, though again one that 
Mason anticipates.  I contend that FEO grounds neither an obligation nor a reason for 
parents to refrain from conferring competitive advantages on their children, since 
FEO is a principle of political morality and therefore is binding only on states.  By 
                                                          
46 Satz, ibid., pp. 160-1; Arneson, “Against Rawlsian Equality of Opportunity”, p. 79.  
47 Mason, “Equality of Opportunity and Differences in Social Circumstances”, Philosophical Quarterly 
54, no. 216 (Jul. 2004): 368-88 at 369-72. 
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way of rejoinder, Mason insists that considerations of social justice apply to the basic 
structure of society and that the family is part of that structure.  (Here Mason cites 
Cohen’s work.) 
 At this point it becomes difficult to conduct a dialogue with Mason, since I 
never set out to demonstrate that FEO was an element of justice; rather I set out to 
demonstrate that FEO is an element of the true political morality.  But I don’t want to 
escape Mason’s objection on a technicality, and fortunately I have a way of making 
my point that doesn’t appeal to a distinction between justice and political morality. 
 The most obvious reason why FEO cannot be binding on individuals is that it 
is based on an ideal that applies only to states.  That ideal, again, is the ideal of a level 
playing field.  It may be—and I certainly hope it is—compelling to suppose that it is 
the job of the state to ensure a level playing field.  But I see no appeal to the idea that 
individuals should level the playing field or even strive towards its being leveled.  In 
this way, leveling the playing field is like providing national defense, securing clean 
drinking water, or setting aside wild areas for recreational purposes: they’re activities 
that don’t even register on our moral radar until we begin to think about what the state 
morally ought to do.48,49 
 This isn’t to deny that activities within the family constitute part of the basic 
structure and are thus subject to principles of justice/political morality.  But there is an 
important ambiguity in the idea of an activity’s being subject to principles of 
justice/political morality.  On the one hand it might mean that the state may 
legitimately regulate those activities in the ways necessary to uphold the relevant 
                                                          
48 Mason anticipates a move quite similar to this; specifically, he anticipates his opponent pointing out 
that an individual is in no position to be able to judge how to advance FEO (ibid., pp. 372-3).  This 
isn’t quite the move I want to make, though I think that it may stem from the correct initial thought—
the idea that the level playing field ideal is not an ideal for individuals—and simply take that thought in 
the wrong direction. 
49 One might doubt that the moral requirements that apply to states could fail to coincide perfectly with 
the moral requirements that apply to individuals.  I argue that that they can; see Sachs, 
“Contractarianism as a Political Morality,” forthcoming in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. 
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principle of justice/political morality.  On the other hand it may mean that the 
individuals who engage in those activities have obligations, grounded in the relevant 
principles of justice/morality, to moderate their activities accordingly.  I am merely 
denying that activities constitutive of the family are subject to principles of 
justice/political morality in the latter sense.  So in at least one sense, the former sense, 
I can and do concede that activities within the family, including the activities by 
which parents confer competitive advantages on their children, are subject to 
principles of justice/political morality.  (Though of course I take FEO to have merely 
pro tanto force and therefore the question of whether the state ought to restrict parents 
in this way depends, for me, on the relative weight of FEO and parental liberty.50) 
 Furthermore, given my claim that FEO is part of the true political morality I 
can say that the state does wrong insofar as it fails to regulate parental activities in 
whatever way is necessary to secure FEO.  This allows me to make a case, based on 
the intuition that one ought not to take advantage of the wrongdoing of others, that 
when the state ought to ban a certain parental activity but fails to do so it is wrong for 
parents to engage in that activity.  So, for instance, I could concede to Adam Swift 
that it is wrong of parents to send their children to private schools.51  But this would 
not amount to committing myself to the very counterintuitive claim that parents are 
obligated in general to forgo the activities that would otherwise give their children 
advantages over other similarly endowed children. 
 Mason has one final bullet in the chamber: an appeal to a case-specific 
intuition.  He says, “If, for example, male heads of families forbid their daughters 
from receiving a formal education, this surely violates principles of equality of 
                                                          
50 See and Brighouse and Swift (“Parents’ Rights and the Value of the Family”, “Legitimate Parental 
Partiality”, and Family Values Part Three) for one view on how this balance should be struck. 
51Adam Swift, “The Morality of School Choice Reconsidered: A Response,” Theory and Research in 
Education 2 (2004): 323-42. 
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opportunity even if educational institutions in the wider society do not discriminate 
against women.”52 
 One thing Mason might mean is that the outcome designated as desirable by 
FEO could not be instantiated under the given circumstances.  This would be true but 
beside the point; the question is who is obligated to bring about the designated 
outcome.  What Mason must mean, then, is that the actions of male heads of families 
in such a society violate fair equality of opportunity.  I admit that I have something in 
the neighborhood of this intuition; I have the intuition that the male heads of families 
in this society are violating an obligation.  But I don’t have the intuition that they’re 
violating an FEO-based obligation.  And I think I’m not alone here.  Take the average 
person and confront her with a vignette like this and what she’s likely to say, I 
suspect, is that the fathers are wronging their daughters by failing to do what parents 
are obligated to do—e.g., not compromise the open future that their children might 




In this essay I’ve laid out a highly specified version of the principle of fair equality of 
opportunity, argued for it and defended it against objections.  My version of FEO 
resolves certain ambiguities that remain from Rawls’s work; in particular it says that 
FEO is to regulate opportunities for jobs and offices as opposed to opportunities for 
broader goods such as success or achievement.  Furthermore, I’ve claimed that since 
                                                          
52 Mason, “Equality of Opportunity and Differences in Social Circumstances,” p. 372 
53 Elsewhere Mason amends the thought experiment with the further stipulation that the father does not 
prohibit his son(s) from receiving an education (Mason, Living Together as Equals (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012), p. 122).  Mason suspects that with this feature stipulated, we’ll have the 
intuition that there’s a comparative wrong— violation of equality of opportunity—being committed 
here as opposed to just the non-comparative wrong of depriving one’s child of an open future.  Again, I 
have something like the intuition Mason expects us to have.  But the comparative wrong that the father 
has committed here, it seems to me, is that wrong of playing favorites with his children. 
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FEO regulates the distribution of opportunities for jobs and offices, as opposed to 
jobs and offices themselves, we can understand how there could be a place for FEO in 
a meritocratic world: the principle should be understood as requiring equal 
opportunity to succeed in the meritocracy.  In addition I’ve offered an original 
understanding of what succeeding in the meritocracy amounts to and why it’s good.  
Succeeding in the meritocracy means obtaining the right job or office—one that calls 
upon the use of one’s refined talents—and is good in virtue of constituting the 
avoidance of a soul-crushing bad, the bad of spending one’s working days doing 
something that one finds uninteresting.  These moves then allowed me to offer novel 
defenses of FEO against the most troubling challenges to which it has been subjected. 
